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1.  INTRODUCTION
Defending large scale enterprise networks from adversary 
attacks is an uphill task faced by present day network 
administrators. Defense approaches against such attacks 
traditionally have been mostly host centric, where attention 
is given to identifying vulnerabilities of the individual hosts 
and taking measures to mitigate them. Vulnerability scanning 
tools, such as Nessus, OpenVAS, Nexpose, etc. provide per 
host vulnerability information and help in achieving these 
objectives. However, one major problem with this approach is 
that it emphasises more on host specific local information and 
does not consider them in the light of global security context 
of the network. Theoretically, an exhaustive vulnerability 
searching and patching may lead to a secure system. However, 
this may not be possible in practice due to the costs involved 
and operational constraints. Moreover, in many cases, attackers 
combine elementary attacks to launch multistage attacks against 
critical assets. These elementary attacks exploit vulnerabilities 
of individual hosts and may be either remote or local. Intrusion 
Detection Systems, either network or host based, can detect 
those elementary attacks but cannot report whether they are 
part of a larger attack chain or not.
An attack graph is an important modelling tool used in 
the assessment of security of enterprise networks. Using attack 
graphs, network administrators can understand how an attacker 
can combine vulnerabilities in multiple hosts in a multi-stage 
attack to compromise critical resources in a network. Moreover 
the size of an attack graph has direct impact on the perceived 
risk. Intuitively, a larger attack graph can mean more number of 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited or more number of attack 
paths to a resource or more attack spread; all implying less 
security and hence more risk. An exhaustive attack graph of a 
network provides global view of its security posture, enabling 
quantitative assessment of the same. Such assessments, when 
performed periodically help a network system to evolve over 
time. 
Since its introduction in 1998, attack graph has attracted 
lots of attention from researchers and a considerable amount of 
research effort has been spent in the development of theory and 
practices around the idea of attack graph. In its earlier days, 
dedicated security teams (called Red teams) used to determine 
overall security of networks by hand-drawing gigantic attack 
graphs and then analysing them. Obviously, this approach was 
tedious, error prone and did not scale up as the network size 
grew. This gave rise to the need for automated methods of 
attack graph generation. Automated techniques also guarantee 
that the generated attack graph is exhaustive and succinct. An 
exhaustive attack graph contains all possible attack paths and a 
succinct attack graph contains only those initial network states 
from where the attacker can reach the goal. Initial research 
proposed custom algorithms, model checking, logic based 
approaches as attack graph generation methods. However, the 
scalability issue in attack graph generation is still a challenging 
research problem. Other research efforts aimed at using attack 
graphs for analysing or quantifying security risks of enterprise 
networks.
Lippmann and Ingols9 has published a survey on attack 
graph generation and analysis techniques, in 2005. This paper 
aims at providing a consolidated view of major attack graph 
generation and analysis techniques reported till now. 
2. ATTACK GRAPH GENERATION
Graph is a natural choice as formalism while considering 
an automated technique for network security analysis. Dacier3 
introduced the concept of privilege graph for describing 
vulnerabilities of a network system. Each node in a privilege 
graph represents a set of privilege owned by a user or a set 
of users and each edge represents a vulnerability. In an attack 
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tree22 each path to a leaf node represents sequence of attacks by 
which an attacker can reach goal state from its initial state. An 
attack graph essentially is a consolidated representation of an 
attack tree where some or all common nodes across different 
attack paths are merged.
Figure 1 shows a simple network configuration that is used 
as a running example throughout this paper. Corresponding 
attack graph representations, namely the exploit dependency 
attack graph; logical attack graph and multiple prerequisite 
attack graph is described in relevant subsections. 
In this network configuration Firewall-1 controls traffic 
between the external and internal network. Assumed location 
of that attacker is on host H0 in the external network. In the 
DMZ of internal network a web server runs on host H1 and 
a login server (via ssh) on host H2. The web service requires 
access to a back end database server which is running on host 
H3. Firewall-1 allows http and ssh traffic to the web server and 
login server respectively, and blocks all other traffic. Firewall-2 
allows access to the database server coming only from the web 
server. Host H1 is running a vulnerable version of Apache web 
server, which has vulnerability (CVE-2006-3747) that allows 
a remote attacker to exploit and gain user privilege on the Web 
Server. The ssh service on H2 has a vulnerability (CVE-2002-
0640), which allows remote attackers to gain user privilege. 
Database server H3 is a Linux box running MySQL database 
which has a remotely exploitable vulnerability (CVE-2009-
2446), enabling attacker to gain user privilege. The Linux 
kernel in host H3 also has vulnerability (CVE-2004-0495) that 
allows local user to gain root privilege. Attacker’s objective 
is to gain root privilege on the database server. for notational 
convenience short symbols are used for different vulnerabilities 
as shown in Table 1. 
2.1  State Enumeration Based Approach
State enumeration based approaches were the initial 
attempts to automated attack graph generation. These 
approaches are based on either custom algorithms or based on 
model checking techniques. 
The concept of attack graph was first introduced by 
Phillips and Swiler19,27, in 1998. In their formalism of attack 
graph also known as the state enumeration graph; nodes 
represent possible system state during execution of an attack. 
A system state comprises of information on host(s), user access 
levels and effects of the attack so far. Edges represent a change 
of state, caused by a single action of the attacker and may be 
weighted based on the attacker’s effort required or the time to 
succeed. Based on this formalism, the authors have presented 
a method28 for automated generation of attack graph with three 
kinds of input information: attack templates, a configuration file 
and an attacker profile. Attack templates represent attacks (both 
known and hypothesised) in the form of a sub-graph describing 
conditions necessary for successful execution of the attack and 
also any new conditions that it may enable. A configuration 
file contains information about the network system under 
consideration. This information includes network topology, 
configuration of network elements such as hosts, routers, 
firewalls, etc. Attacker profile contains information about 
attacker’s capabilities. The attack graph generation algorithm 
starts from the initial state. It matches attack templates to the 
configuration of the network system and attacker’s profile in a 
forward exploration manner and generates the graph iteratively. 
Put in other ways an attack graph is an instantiation of the attack 
templates to the configuration information and attacker profile. 
The generation method addressed the issues of redundant path, 
node and directed cycle elimination. But the authors have not 
provided any complexity analysis; only empirical results on 
small examples are given. The obvious problem with this kind 
of formalism is the issue of state-space explosion.
Ritchey and Ammann20 first proposed the use of model 
checking techniques for attack graph generation. Model 
checking in general is a technique which checks whether a 
formal model M of a system satisfies a given property p or 
not. If the property p is false in the model M, then the model 
checker outputs a counter example describing a sequence of 
state transitions which ends in violation of the property. Model 
checking techniques are popularly used for verifying finite-
state reactive systems, such as sequential circuit designs and 
communication protocols. One benefit of using model checking 
techniques over custom algorithms for attack graph generation 
is that users need not worry about the problem of handling large 
state space, which is otherwise elegantly handled by standard 
model checking software. The first step in this approach is 
to build a model of the system under analysis. This model 
includes information on hosts along with their vulnerabilities, 
host connectivity, current view of the attacker and exploits 
that change the model’s state. The kind of input information 
required to build the system model is quite similar to the 
approach of Phillips and Swiler19,27 except that in this case, the 
host connectivity information represent connectivity between 
hosts that remain after considering all traffic-filtering devices 
such as routers, firewalls etc. The current view of the attacker 
Figure 1. Simple network configuration.
Software Vulnerabiity (CVE-ID) Short symbol
Apache Web Server v1.3, CVE-2006-3747 V1
OpenSSH v2.3.1-v3.3 CVE-2002-0640 V2
MySQL v4.0, v5.0 CVE-2009-2446 V3
Linux Kernel v2.4, v2.6 CVE-2004-0495 V4
Table 1. Short symbols used for different vulnerabilities
Major approaches to attack graph generation are as 
follows.  
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is same as that of attacker profile and the exploits describe 
similar things as attack templates. Authors have used the 
SMV model checker tool. Desirable security properties of the 
system are specified in temporal logic formulae and the model 
checker finds out whether the model of the system satisfies the 
formulae. If not, it generates counter examples which show the 
sequence of states, from the initial state to the state where the 
property is violated. As each state-change corresponds to the 
event of execution of an exploit, a counter example produces 
an attack path which describes sequence of exploits that leads 
an attacker from its initial position to a compromised resource. 
Set of all such counter examples would produce a complete 
attack graph.
Sheyner23, et al. proposed a method for automated 
generation of attack graph using NuSMV model checking tool. 
The description of the model of the network is fed to a compiler 
which translates it to the input language of the model checker 
NuSMV. This model is essentially a finite labelled transition 
system. Each state is labelled with a propositional formula. 
This network model includes 
(i) host connectivity information expressed as a ternary 
relation R(h1, h2, p) meaning that host h1 can reach host 
h2 on port p
(ii) trust relationship Tr(h1, h2) meaning that a user of host 
h2 can log into h1 without any authentication i.e. host h1 
trusts host h2 
(iii) intruder privilege levels on hosts (none/user/root)
(iv)  Intrusion detection systems (IDS) as a relationship ids(h1, 
h2, a)={s, d, b} meaning that an attack a from host h1 to h2 
is stealthy/detectable/both by an IDS sensor. 
Each atomic attack is specified as rules and has four 
components: intruder preconditions, network preconditions, 
intruder effects and network effects. Safety property of the 
system is specified in computation tree logic (CTL). If the safety 
property is not satisfied, the NuSMV model checker generates 
all possible counter examples whereas the SMV model checker 
used by Ritchey and Ammann generates only one counter 
example. They termed the resulting graph as a scenario graph. 
However, compared to state enumeration graphs which take 
more of an ‘attack centric’ view of the system, scenario graphs 
are more generic and can model both benign and malicious 
system events. Sheyner25 augmented the idea of scenario 
graph to include liveness requirement in addition to safety 
requirements. for this, he used a system model which supports 
both finite and infinite execution.
Performance of attack graph generation techniques based 
on model checking20,23,25 is dependent on the efficiency of the 
model checker tools themselves, which are specifically designed 
for handling large state spaces. These techniques encode 
network state information in number of state variables which 
increase considerably with increasing network size, number of 
atomic attacks and vulnerabilities. They also face significant 
exponential state-space problems even for moderate-sized 
networks. Performance results reported by Sheyner23, et al. 
gives some idea about this problem. for 2 hosts with 4 atomic 
attacks, the model has 91 bits of state information, and 110 
reachable states.  for 4 hosts with 8 atomic attacks, the model 
has 229 bits of state information, and 6190 reachable states. 
The resulting attack graph has 5948 nodes and 68364 edges 
and needed 2 h to generate. 
2.2  TVA Approach
Earlier approaches to attack graph generation suffered 
from scalability issues as the attack graph representation 
used in those approaches, i.e. the state enumeration graph 
or the scenario graph, assumed full exponential state-space. 
The monotonicity assumption on attacker’s behaviour, first 
introduced by Ammann1,  et al. was a key enabler in handling 
this issue. This assumption says that preconditions of an attack 
are never invalidated by successful execution of another attack. 
Although this may not be true in all the cases (i.e. buffer overflow 
attack against a service causes it to terminate, preventing 
further use in other attacks), the monotonicity assumption 
helps in reducing the complexity of analysis from exponential 
to polynomial. The resulting graph which enumerates all such 
possible exploit sequences is known as the exploit dependency 
graph. In worst case, this representation has number of nodes 
as quadratic to the number of exploits. In exploit dependency 
attack graph, each exploit or dependency appears only once and 
there are no edges between independent exploits. Whereas, in 
a state enumeration attack graph, there may be edges between 
exploits even though there are no dependency relationships 
between them. Moreover, a single attack path may appear more 
than once in a state enumeration attack graph.
Topological vulnerability analysis (TVA)6,7 adopts a 
topological approach to network vulnerability analysis. It 
considers a set of modelled attacker exploit on a network and 
then finds out different sequences of exploits or attack paths 
starting from attacker’s initial state leading to compromise of 
critical network assets. for this, TVA requires an extensive 
knowledgebase of known vulnerabilities and attack techniques. 
TVA attack graph generation engine uses the algorithm 
proposed by Ammann1, et al. for attack graph generation. It 
has O(n6) computational complexity, which was later improved 
to O(n3) Ammann2, et al.; n being the number of hosts in the 
network. 
The attack graph model used in TVA uses two types of 
nodes, exploit nodes and security condition nodes. This model 
of attack graph is based on exploit dependency graphs. Exploit 
nodes represent attacks (exploitation of certain vulnerabilities) 
and security condition nodes represent either the attack post-
condition or pre-condition. An exploit is defined by pre and 
post conditions.  Directed edges from security condition nodes 
to attack nodes represent pre-conditions of an attack, of which 
all must be met for an attack to be successful. A directed edge 
from an attack node to a security condition node represents post-
condition of an attack. An advantage of exploit dependency 
graphs is that instead of modelling hosts, exploits on hosts 
are modeled, thus reducing the computational complexity. On 
the other hand, this model requires information on low-level 
attack details. Vulnerability information are based on pre- and 
post-conditions. figure 2 shows the exploit dependency attack 
graph for the example network of fig. 1. 
In exploit dependency attack graph, ovals represent 
exploits and are labelled with corresponding vulnerabilities. 
Other nodes represent either some network condition or 
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attacker’s capability. for example, network condition http 
(H0, H1) means accessibility of web service on host H1 from 
host H0. Attacker capability user(H0) means, attacker has user 
privilege on host H0. Directed edges in and out of exploit nodes 
identify pre and post-conditions respectively of an attack. for 
example, exploitation of MySQL vulnerability CVE-2009-
2446 on host H3 from host H1 i.e. V3(H1, H3) requires pre-
conditions user(H1) and mysql(H1, H3) and generates a post-
condition user(H3). Exploit dependency attack graph elegantly 
enumerates different attack paths leading to a critical resource. 
In this example, there are two attack paths leading to attacker 
gaining root privilege on H3. They are V1(H0, H1) → V3(H1, 
H3) → V4(H3) and V2(H0, H2) → V1(H2, H1) → V3(H1, 
H3) → V4(H3) respectively. 
2.3 Logic Programming Based Approach 
Multi host, multistage vulnerability analysis (MulVAL)17 
is a logic-programming based approach to network security 
analysis. It uses a representation of attack graph known as 
logical attack graph which shows logical dependencies among 
attack goals and configuration information. A node in the 
logical attack graph is a logical statement which encodes only 
some part of network state. Unlike the state enumeration graph 
or scenario graph, it does not represent or encode the entire 
state of the network. Edges represent the causality relationships 
between various network configurations. Size of a logical 
attack graph is polynomial to the network being analysed. 
However, one requirement of logical attack graph is that the 
cause of an attacker’s potential privilege should be expressible 
as a propositional formula in terms of network configuration 
information. A logical attack graph is a directed graph. It can 
also be represented as a tree. 
figure 3 shows the logical attack graph, corresponding to 
the simple network configuration of Fig. 1. It contains two types 
of nodes, i.e. derivation nodes and fact nodes.  Rectangles and 
circles represent derivation nodes and fact nodes respectively. 
Derivation nodes are labeled with interaction rules.  fact nodes 
are labeled with logical statements in the form of a predicate 
applied to its arguments. Shaded circles are primitive fact nodes 
i.e. facts that hold true in the initial state. Un-shaded circles 
represent derived fact nodes, i.e. new facts that are generated 
as a result of application of interaction rules over existing 
facts. Edges in a logical attack graph represent a ‘depends on’ 
relationship.
To describe system properties MulVAL uses Datalog, 
which is a syntactic subset of the Prolog programming language. 
Required input data such as software vulnerability advisories, 
configuration and network topology information are encoded as 
Datalog tuples, whereas attack techniques are specified using 
Datalog rules. These rules are hand-coded and specify exploits 
such as code execution, file access, and privilege escalation. 
MulVAL uses Prolog logic engine XSB35 as reasoning engine 
for evaluating rules on input facts. XSB computes all possible 
paths to satisfy a defined goal. 
following is an example of interaction rules in Datalog. 
Rule 1: Remote exploit of a privilege-escalation vulnerability 
in a service program
execCode(Host, User) :-
 networkService(Host, Program, Protocol, Port, User),
 vulExists(Host, VulID, Program, remoteExploit, 
privEscalation),
 netAccess(Attacker, Host, Protocol, Port).
This is a generic rule which specifies the pre and post-
condition for this attack: 
if 
 (Program is running as User on Host as a service listening 
on Protocol and Port)  AND
 (it contains a remotely exploitable vulnerability whose 
impact is privilege escalation) AND
 (the attacker can access the service through the network) 
then 
 (the attacker can execute arbitrary code on the machine as 
User)
Similarly Rule 2, 3 and 4 are other interaction rules that have 
been used for generating the example attack graph. 
Rule 2: Local exploit of a privilege-escalation vulnerability in 
a service program
execCode(Host, root) :-
 vulExists(Host, VulID, Program, localExploit, 
privEscalation),
 execCode(Host, User).
Rule 3: Direct network access
netAccess(Source, Target, Protocol, Port):-
hacl(Source, Target, Protocol, Port)
located(attacker, Source)
Rule 4: Multi-hop access
netAccess(Source, Target, Protocol, Port):-
execCode(Source, User)
hacl(Source, Target, dbProtocol, dbPort)
 Network (router and firewalls) configurations are modeled as 
abstract host access-control lists (HACL) in form of logical 
statements using the predicate hacl. Predicate vulExists 
Figure 2.  Exploit dependency attack graph.
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encodes output of vulnerability scanner tool.  
following is a complete list of labels of nodes in the logical 
attack graph of fig. 3.
hacl(H0, H1, httpProtocol, httpPort)1. 
located(Attacker, H0)2. 
direct network access3. 
netAccess(H0, H1, httpProtocol, httpPort)4. 
networkService(H1, httpd, httpProtocol, httpPort, 5. 
Apache)
vulExists(H1, ’CVE-2006-3747’, httpd, remoteExploit, 6. 
privEscalation)
remote exploit of a server program7. 
execCode(H1, Apache)8. 
hacl(H1, H3, dbProtocol, dbPort)9. 
multi-hop access10. 
netAccess(H1, H3, dbProtocol, dbPort)11. 
networkService(H3, mysqld, dbProtocol, dbPort, mysql)12. 
vulExists(H3, ’CVE-2009-2446’, mysqld, remoteExploit, 13. 
privEscalation)
remote exploit of a server program14. 
execCode(H3, Apache)15. 
vulExists(H3, ’CVE-2004-0495’, linux-kernel, 16. 
localExploit, privEscalation)
local exploit of OS kernel17. 
execCode(H3, root)18. 
hacl(H0, H2, sshProtocol, sshPort)19. 
direct network access20. 
netAccess(H0, H2, sshProtocol, sshPort)21. 
networkService(H2, sshd, sshProtocol, sshPort, SSH)22. 
vulExists(H2, ’CVE-2002-0640’, sshd, remoteExploit, 23. 
privEscalation)
remote exploit of a server program24. 
execCode(H2, SSH)25. 
hacl(H1, H2, httpProtocol, httpPort)26. 
multi-hop access27. 
netAccess(H2, H1, httpProtocol, httpPort)28. 
remote exploit of a server program29. 
The MulVAL logic programming based approach17 has 
O(n2) complexity under the assumption of constant table look-
up time. Empirical results show that, worst case running time 
varies between O(n2) to O(n3) for number of hosts upto 1000 
with up to 100 vulnerabilities.
2.4 NetSPA Approach
The network security planning architecture (Net 
SPA)5 attack graph generation system is based on a new 
representation of attack graph, i.e. the multiple prerequisites 
graph which scales linearly to the size of the network. This tool 
uses readily available source of data to automatically compute 
network reachability, classify vulnerabilities, build the graph 
and recommend actions to improve network security. Multiple 
prerequisite graphs are much faster to generate and have 
greater expressive power than the author’s previous works on 
predictive graphs10,11.
A multiple-prerequisite attack graph consists of three types 
of nodes, i.e. state nodes, prerequisite nodes, and vulnerability 
instance nodes. State nodes represent attacker’s level of access 
on a given host. Prerequisite nodes represent either a reachability 
group or preconditions of one or several attacks. Vulnerability 
instance nodes represent particular vulnerabilities. Directed edges 
from state nodes to prerequisite nodes represent the capabilities 
those states enable for the attacker. Prerequisite nodes point to 
vulnerability instance nodes that represent the set of attacks that 
the prerequisite node enables. Directed edge from vulnerability 
instance nodes to a single state node represent the state the 
attacker can reach by successfully exploiting the vulnerability. 
Put in other way, a state provides prerequisites, which allow 
exploitation of vulnerability instances, which in turn provide 
more states to the attacker. The concept of prerequisite nodes 
helps in reducing the number of edges compared to having state 
nodes pointing directly to vulnerability instance nodes, since 
many state nodes can imply the same set of attacks.
figure 4 shows the multiple prerequisite attack graph 
corresponding to the network configuration of Fig. 1. Circles 
represent state nodes, rectangles represent prerequisite nodes, 
and triangles represent vulnerability instance nodes. State nodes 
A, B, C, D, E represent attacker’s level of access on different 
hosts i.e. user(H0), user(H1), user(H2), user(H3), and root(H3) 
respectively. Directed edge from state node A i.e. user(H0) to 
prerequisite node ‘Can Reach H1, H2’ represent the capability 
of attacker that is enabled by this state. Directed edge from 
prerequisite node ‘Can Reach H1, H2’ to vulnerability instance 
nodes V1 and V2 represent attacks enabled by this prerequisite. 
Only when the attacker is in state B, it enables reachability to 
host H3. The attacker can now gain state D via exploitation of 
vulnerability V3.  
NetSPA generation method scales roughly as O(n log n). 
Experimental results show that it can scale up to 50000 hosts 
for synthetic networks.  
3. ATTACK GRAPH BASED SECURITY 
ANALYSIS
The sole objective of generating an attack graph is to 
enable assessment of security. There are many ways in which 
information encoded in an attack graph can be used to gain 
vital insight into the global security posture of a network. This 
helps security administrators to make correct decisions about 
mitigation strategies.   
3.1  IDS Alert Correlation and Sensor Placement
Multi-step network intrusions comprise of multiple attack Figure 3. Logical attack graph.
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steps with one preparing for the next. Intrusion detection system 
alert correlation techniques help in deciding whether an isolated 
alert is part of an ongoing multi-step network intrusion. It also 
helps in attack scenario reconstruction. Popular alert correlation 
techniques use prior knowledge about attack strategies or alert 
dependencies. Other techniques aggregate alerts with similar 
attributes (such as alerts with same destination addresses) or 
statistical patterns.
Almost all these techniques use nested loop approach 
where each new alert is compared with previously received 
alerts to mark those which prepare for the new one. This 
approach fits well in off-line applications such as intrusion 
forensics, by storing in memory index of received alerts. 
However, for applications like defense against multi-step 
intrusions which require near real time alert correlation, this 
approach fails miserably due to the growing size of the alert 
index. One solution to this problem is to maintain a sliding 
window of previously received alerts close enough to the new 
alert. But an attacker can defeat this method either by passively 
delaying the second step or actively introducing new alerts 
between two steps.
Noel14, et al. first reported use of attack graphs in 
minimising the effect of false alarms by correlating isolated 
intrusion alerts as part of multistep attack paths. Their alert 
correlation method is based on the shortest distance between 
exploits in the attack graph. Also, any IDS alert which does not 
feature in the possible future activities of the attacker (as can be 
observed in the attack graph) can readily be classified as false. 
However this solution is based on the assumption that the attack 
graph is updated in a timely fashion corresponding to changes 
in network topology and configuration. Also, the entire attack 
graph should be resident in memory for this analysis, which is 
a severe restriction for large enterprise networks.
Wang30, et al. proposed a queue graph based approach 
for removing the limitations of the nested loop approach. The 
queue graph data structure only keeps in memory the latest 
alert matching each of the known exploits. 
TVA attack graph has been used for planning optimal 
placement of IDS sensors15 against all possible attacks. In this 
technique, isolated intrusion alerts are mapped to known exploits 
(represented as nodes) in an attack graph. It enables correlation 
of alerts corresponding to a multi-step attack scenario, and also 
prioritisation of alerts based on distance from critical network 
assets. further, using the knowledge of network vulnerability 
paths encoded in an attack graph, network administrators can 
formulate best possible options for responding to attacks.
3.2 Minimum Cost Network Hardening
An attack graph reveals the different ways network 
resources can be compromised, but it does not provide any 
direct solution to harden the network. One of the network 
hardening measure is to remove or patch vulnerabilities. A 
good network hardening approach should remove specific 
vulnerabilities so that none of the attack paths leading to given 
critical resources can be realised, and also the cost involved 
in removing those vulnerabilities is minimum13. Jha8 , et al. 
have presented a technique which allows analysts to determine 
minimal set of security measures (i.e. removal of attacks) that 
would guarantee safety of the system. They have provided a 
formal characterisation of the problem and have proved that it 
is polynomially equivalent to the minimum hitting set problem. 
However these solutions suffer from implementation issues 
as some of the vulnerabilities are consequences of exploiting 
other vulnerabilities and the consequences cannot be removed 
without first removing the causes. So, for removing a single 
vulnerability there may be multiple choices with different 
costs, considering the different sets of vulnerabilities it may 
implicitly depend upon. A different approach of minimum 
cost of network hardening was presented by Noel13, et al. 
and improved by Wang29, et al. The authors considered each 
vulnerability as a Boolean variable and derived a logical 
statement for the negation of given critical statement, in terms 
of initial conditions. If this logical statement is represented in 
disjunctive normal form (DNf), then each of the disjunctions 
in it provides a different hardening option. The option with 
minimum cost is chosen as the network hardening solution.
3.3 Network Forensics
forensic analysis is typically performed after an incidence 
of break-in occurs. Its objective is to find attacker’s probable 
actions, to assess damage and to collect digital evidence 
in case legal action is required. Clever attackers use anti-
forensics techniques and tools to prevent proper forensic 
investigation. These techniques aim at reducing quality and 
quantity of digital evidences or traceable information captured 
by different tools.
Attack graph based forensic analysis enables administrators 
to prove that a series of IDS alerts are not isolated; rather they 
correspond to a sequence of attacks in a coherent attack plan. 
Liu12, et al. proposed a solution where they have augmented 
attack graphs with anti-forensic activity nodes that help in 
identifying missing evidences.
Figure 4. Multiple prerequisite attack graph.
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3.4 Attack Graph Based Security Metrics
To improve the security of a network, administrators 
must be able to measure the same. A security metric measures 
or assesses the extent to which a system meets its security 
objectives. Using suitable security metrics one can measure 
how secure a network currently is, and how secure it would 
be after introducing new security mechanisms or configuration 
changes. This is necessary if a network has to evolve through 
network hardening.
An attack graph shows all possible attack paths that an 
attacker may follow to achieve her goal. However, in general, 
it does not provide any solution to harden the network. 
Traditionally, network hardening involves removal or patching 
of vulnerabilities, thereby preventing attackers from exploiting 
them to compromise critical hosts. However, it is not always 
possible to remove all vulnerabilities in a network setting. 
This may be due to high cost involved or owing to operational 
constraints. So, there is a need to have good security metrics 
which enable comparison of relative security of different 
network configuration options. A number of security metrics 
have been proposed in literature based on attack graphs.
Network compromise percentage (NCP) security metric 
indicates the percentage of network hosts where the attacker 
has obtained user or superuser privilege. Asset values can 
be associated with individual hosts before computing the 
NCP metric. This metric was proposed by Lippmann11, et al. 
Computation of this metric may require traversal of the entire 
attack graph.
Weakest adversary security metric18 measures the security 
strength of a network in terms of the strength of the weakest 
adversary who can successfully penetrate the network. It 
computes the minimal set of initial conditions the weakest 
adversary should satisfy in order to compromise the network.
Idika and Bhargava4 have presented a solution which 
overcomes the shortcomings of existing attack graph based 
security metrics, i.e. Shortest path metric, number of paths 
metric, and mean of path lengths metric. Their approach 
combines these existing metrics with other metrics, to overcome 
their shortcomings.
Wang 31, et al. proposed attack resistance security metric 
to measure the attack resistance of a network configuration 
in terms of measures of individual exploits. The authors 
introduced the notion of exploit dependency graph which 
shows different possible sequences of exploits that an attacker 
can execute to compromise critical hosts in a network setting. 
The dependency relation between the exploits may be either 
conjunctive or disjunctive. They also introduced two types 
of composition operators corresponding to disjunctive and 
conjunctive dependency relationships between individual 
exploits to compute the overall security measure, i.e. the 
attack resistance of the network configuration. Authors used 
a function to capture the information about how execution of 
one exploit may affect the resistance value of another exploit. 
This is helpful in cases where two or more exploits involve the 
same vulnerability. Such exploits are related by this function to 
indicate the fact that successful exploitation of one instance of 
the vulnerability should reduce the resistance of the others due 
to the attacker’s accumulated experiences and tools.
Zero day vulnerabilities are those for which there is 
no prior knowledge or experience. The k-zero day safety34 
security metric is based on the number of unknown zero day 
vulnerabilities. A network is said to be k-zero day safe if at 
least k unknown vulnerabilities are required for compromising 
a network asset, regardless of types of those vulnerabilities. 
A higher value of k indicates a relatively secure network. The 
authors have introduced the idea of zero day attack graph for 
computing zero day safety of a network.
Noel and Jajodia16 proposed a suite of security metrics 
based on attack graph of a network, for measuring overall 
security risk. The metrics are grouped into families which are 
then combined into a single score. Single risk score is often 
beneficial for network administrators in situations where they 
have to interpret multiple scores. The different families of 
security metrics are 
(i) Victimisation: scores network services and their 
vulnerabilities, 
(ii) Size: measures risk in terms of the attack graph size,
(iii) Containment: measures security risk in terms of the 
degree with which the attack graph contains attacks across 
different network protection domains such as different 
subnets, and 
(iv)  Topology: based on graph theoretic properties of the attack 
graph such as the weakly connected components, strongly 
connected components, length of maximum shortest path 
etc. 
The construction of an attack graph is based on the 
assumption that, a vulnerability can always be exploited. But, 
in reality, there is a wide range of probabilities associated 
with exploitability of vulnerabilities. This probability is 
dependent on the skill of the attacker and the difficulty of the 
exploit. Attack graphs show only what is possible without any 
indication of what is likely.
Attack graph based probabilistic security metric32,26 
approach uses common vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) 
values for individual exploits and computes a cumulative score 
considering the causal relationship among exploits and security 
conditions. 
Wang33, et al. presented an approach which integrates 
attack graph and Hidden Markov model (HMM) together, 
for exploring the probabilistic relation between system 
observations and states. They have used a modified version 
of dependency attack graph to represent network assets 
and vulnerabilities. This is then fed to HMM for estimating 
attack states, whereas their transitions are driven by a set of 
predefined cost factors associated with potential attacks and 
countermeasures. A heuristic searching algorithm is employed 
to automatically infer the optimal security hardening through 
cost-benefit analysis.
4. CONCLUSION
Attack graph is a useful abstraction of security state of 
a network, enabling automated solutions for reasoning about 
the same. This paper has given a short review of attack graph 
generation and analysis techniques reported so far in literature. 
Some of the research challenges in attack graph based network 
security analysis are.
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Attack graph generation solutions require input information • 
which is captured using different software tools; but, this 
is not a completely automated process. Information about 
different vulnerabilities, i.e. their pre- and post-conditions 
are still manually encoded by domain experts. This is due 
to the fact that, public information about vulnerabilities 
are mostly available in the form of unstructured or semi-
structured texts, rendering their automated extraction 
difficult. Natural language processing (NLP) techniques 
can be used for this purpose. 
Scalability issue in attack graph generation for moderate • 
and large enterprise networks is still a challenging task. 
Big data framework for large graph processing is a 
promising solution towards achieving this goal. 
As far as the different attack graph based analysis • 
techniques are concerned, use of attack graph in network 
forensics analysis is a relatively unexplored area.
for forecasting possible future attacks, existing attack • 
graph based techniques correlates intrusion alerts. 
Possible future attack paths from that point onwards forms 
a prediction. But in practice, many such attack paths are 
never tried by attackers. This lack of precision can be 
overcome by considering more context information such 
as intrusion response actions, exploit probabilities etc.          
Also, many of the analysis techniques are tied with a • 
particular representation of attack graph. There is a 
need of uniform semantics of attacks, so that analysis 
techniques can be applied irrespective of the underlying 
representation and generation method.
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